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Implied Private Rights of Action: Definition, and
Factors to Determine Whether a Private Action Will
Be Implied from a Federal Statute
Caroline Bermeo Newcombe*
When the heirs of singer Ray Charles wanted to terminate a copyright,
they had something in common with a student who wanted to obtain
damages from her school after a teacher assaulted her. Both the heirs
and the student asked a court to judicially imply a private right of action
from a federal statute. This Article will provide insight into the subject of
implied private rights of action. It will define what a private right of
action is, discuss where private actions came from, and then provide
sixteen guidelines to predict whether a court will imply a private action
from a federal statute.
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INTRODUCTION
When the heirs of singer Ray Charles wanted to terminate a copyright,
they had something in common with a student who wanted to obtain
damages from her school after a teacher assaulted her. Both the heirs and
the student asked a court to judicially imply a private right of action from
a federal statute. The aim of this Article is to provide insight into the
subject of implied private rights of action and to suggest guidelines to
determine whether a private action will be implied from a federal statute.
Implied private rights of action appear in areas as diverse as copyright
law,1 education law,2 civil rights law,3 and securities law.4 The
1. Ray Charles Found. v. Robinson, 795 F.3d 1109, 1122 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[A]n implied private
cause of action exists under the termination provisions [of the Copyright Act].”).
2. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992) (recognizing implied right
of action to allow a student to recover damages against her school under Title IX); see also Jackson
v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005) (recognizing implied private right of action
for retaliation under Title IX).
3. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969) (finding private right of action
implied under the Voting Rights Act).
4. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 37 (2011) (“We have implied a
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importance of these actions cannot be overestimated.5 Indeed, afraid that
a court might imply a private action from a statute that does not contain
one, the drafters of the Communications Act expressly prohibited the
implication of any private action at all.6
This Article will begin by defining what a private right of action is in
Part I. Part II will briefly discuss the origin of implied private rights of
action. Because statutes are the most important source of implied private
action today, Part III will provide guidelines to determine whether a
private right of action will be implied from a federal statute.
I. DEFINITION OF AN IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
A private right of action allows a private plaintiff to bring an action
based directly on a public statute, the Constitution, or federal common
law. Although Congress has placed express private rights of action into
legislation such as the Clayton Antitrust Act 7 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act,8 implied private rights of action are not created by
Congress. They are created by courts. A judicially created implied private
right of action allows a private plaintiff to enforce a public statute, despite
the fact that the statute itself contains no express right of action. 9 For
example, courts have recognized a private party’s right to bring an action
for violation of certain provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, even
though “Congress made no specific reference to a private right of
action. . . .”10 Why is this important? It is important because in instances

private cause of action from the text and purpose of §10(b) [of the Securities Exchange Act].”).
5. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963, 965 (1994) (implied private rights of action have been
used to obtain billions of dollars from claims based on securities fraud) (emphasis added).
6. Communications and Video Accessibility Act, 47 U.S.C. § 613(j) (2010) (“Nothing in this
section shall be construed to authorize any private right of action to enforce any requirement of this
section or any regulation hereunder. The [Federal Communications] Commission shall have
exclusive jurisdiction with respect to any complaint under this section.”).
7. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982) (“Any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue. . . .”) (emphasis added).
8. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (a)(1) (“The remedies and procedures
set forth in [the Act] are . . . provid[ed] to any person who is being subjected to discrimination on
the basis of disability in violation of [this Act].”) (emphasis added).
9. A district court explained the difference between an “express” and an “implied” private
action:
Many federal statutes provide a private cause of action through their express terms. Other
federal statutes, however, merely define rights and duties, and are silent on the issue of
whether an individual may bring suit to enforce them. For statutes in this latter
category . . . courts have held that “implied” private rights of action may exist subject to
statutory interpretation.
Landegger v. Cohen, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1284 (D. Colo. 2013).
10. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1964), abrogated on other grounds by Ziglar
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where no express private right of action exists in a statute, a private
plaintiff seeking to enforce such a statute has an alternative source of
relief: a judicially implied private right of action. Justice Powell
compared express versus implied rights of action in the following
manner: “[W]e are not dealing here with any private right created by the
express language of [a federal statute] . . . We are dealing with a private
cause of action which has been judicially found to exist. . . .”11
The examples above demonstrate that, although Congress envisioned
that it would be a public agency like the Securities Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) that would unilaterally enforce certain statutes, this is not what
happened. Federal courts, through the judicial creation of implied private
rights of action, have allowed individual plaintiffs to bring private claims
under various public statutes that do not expressly provide for such
actions.12
Moving from examples and turning to the technical definition of a
private right of action, these actions are defined as the “right of a private
party to seek judicial relief from injuries caused by another’s violation of
a legal requirement.”13 Normally this “legal requirement” is based on a
statute passed by Congress. However, implied private actions can also be
based on the United States Constitution, federal regulations, or federal
common law.14
Having discussed what an implied private right of action is, it is
important to note what it is not. Cases involving the existence of an
implied right of action are distinct from cases involving standing.15
Standing focuses on the nature of the plaintiff’s injury. 16 In contrast,
cases involving the existence of an implied cause of action focus on the
right the plaintiff is claiming. 17 Put another way, standing involves “who”
v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
11. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748–49 (1975) (emphasis added).
12. The question of whether to create a private right of action has been described by the Supreme
Court in the following way: “Since the [federal statute] does not explicitly create a private
enforcement mechanism, the initial question presented . . . is whether such a private right of action
can be implied on behalf of those allegedly injured by a claimed violation of [the statute].”
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 289–90 (1981).
13. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 730 n.1 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
14. See infra notes 24–28.
15. See La. Landmarks Soc., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 85 F.3d 1119, 1122 n.3 (5th Cir.
1996).
16. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (noting that there are three
elements necessary to establish “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing”).
17. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) (distinguishing between a plaintiff’s
right and a plaintiff’s relief). Most federal courts are aware of the distinction, and caution that before
addressing any standing issue, “a court must answer the threshold question of whether a statute
affords a plaintiff a private right of action.” Asbury Park Bd. of Educ. v. Hope Acad. Charter Sch.,
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may assert a cause of action, while implied private right of action cases
involve the entirely different question of whether the cause of action itself
exists.18
In addition to standing, there is another area that presents a source of
confusion for anyone entering the world of implied private right of action
analysis. This is the area of private attorneys general.19 Plaintiffs who
become private attorneys general usually do so to advance the public
interest.20 Plaintiffs proceeding under an implied private right of action
generally do so to advance their own interest.21 If a private right of action
plaintiff recovers damages against a defendant, the plaintiff keeps the
money. If a private attorney general plaintiff obtains a penalty from a
defendant, the fine usually goes to the government.22
II. SOURCES OF IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS
Implied private rights of action can be separated into two categories:
theoretical sources and subject matter sources. Subject matter sources are
those broad areas of law such as education law, securities law, or civil
rights law from which implied private rights of action can arise.
Theoretical sources, on the other hand, provide the foundation for the
implication of private rights of action in all areas of law.
A. Theoretical Sources
This Article takes the position that there are four theoretical sources of
federal implied private rights of action. These sources are: (a) the United
278 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 n.2 (D.N.J. 2003).
18. In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC, 721 F.3d 54, 68 (2d Cir. 2013) (“However, the
question of who may assert a right of action is presented ordinarily only if a right of action has been
found to exist.”) (emphasis added).
19. The term seems to have made its first appearance in 1943, when a federal judge noted that
“even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest[,] [these] persons, so authorized, are, so
to speak, private Attorney Generals.” Associated Indus. of N.Y. State v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704
(2d Cir. 1943), vacated, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
20. Justice Harlan described the interests of private attorneys general as “bereft of any personal
or propriety coloration . . . hav[ing] standing as ‘representatives of the public interest.’” Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119–20 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
21. See id. at 119 n.5. Private actions contain “almost no mention of vindicating the public’s
rights . . . or other similar expressions of serving the common good. . . . ” Pamela H. Bucy, Private
Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 15 (2002).
22. See Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 580 F. Supp. 862, 863 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (“Because there
is no private right of action for damages under the F.W.P.C.A. [Federal Water Pollution Control
Act], any fines levied would be payable to the Government and not to the plaintiff.”) (emphasis
added). Another difference is that, unlike implied private right of action plaintiffs, a plaintiff
proceeding as a private attorney general can, in some cases, recover attorneys’ fees on the ground
that they are “vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.” Fox v. Vice,
563 U.S. 826, 833 (2011).

2017]

Implied Private Rights of Action

123

States Constitution;23 (b) “limited” federal common law;24 (c) federal
regulations;25 and (d) federal statutes.26
Statutes are the most common source of implied private rights of
actions in federal courts.27 Because of their importance as the primary
source of implied private rights of action today, the remainder of this
Article will provide guidelines to determine whether a private action will
be implied from a federal statute. These guidelines can be better
understood after a brief discussion of the development of implied private
actions themselves.
B. Development of Implied Private Rights of Action
The doctrine of implied private rights of action, so heavily dependent
23. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (holding there is a
federal remedy for an unlawful search and arrest not limited to conduct condemned by state law).
“Bivens authorizes a private cause of action against federal officials . . . who violate an individual’s
constitutional rights while acting under color of federal law.” Mullen v. Bureau of Prisons, 843 F.
Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D.D.C. 2012).
24. The need to provide a uniform rule to resolve interstate controversies is an example of a
limited federal common law area which can provide the basis for an implied private right of action.
See, e.g., Drucker v. O’Brien Moving & Storage, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 616 (D. Nev. 1990), aff’d on
other grounds, 963 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff was allowed to bring an implied private
right of action, based on federal common law, in a case arising from an interstate move involving
a common carrier. The district court specifically found that “it is important that the rules [involving
the interstate movement of goods by a common carrier] be uniform throughout the United
States. . . .” Id. at 623.
25. Implied private rights of action can be based on federal regulations designed to implement
a federal statute. For example, Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951)) is a regulation designed
to implement section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act. Private actions brought under Rule 10b5 have become “the most litigated segment of securities law.” ALFRED F. CONARD, ET AL.,
ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION: CASES, STATUTES, AND ANALYSIS ON EMPLOYMENT, AGENCY,
PARTNERSHIPS, ASSOCIATIONS, AND CORPORATIONS 935 (4th ed. 1987).
26. Of course, state statutes can provide the basis for state implied private rights of action. E.g.,
Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 630 P.2d 840, 848 (Or. 1981) (holding the state statute did not
give rise to a claim for relief in private actions). However, as its title suggests, this Article is about
federal statutes. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss state implied private rights of action.
27. Grundfest, supra note 5, at 963. (“Most private securities fraud litigation arises pursuant to
statutory provisions . . . provisions for which the courts have implied private damage remedies that
are not express in the statute.”) (emphasis added). One of the reasons statutes are the primary source
of implied private rights of action is because courts have refused to extend private actions based on
the Constitution (so-called Bivens actions) into new contexts. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct.
1843, 1855 (2017). In addition, actions based on “limited common law” are rare. They are limited
to unique situations such as the need for uniformity in a case involving an interstate move, an
interstate bill of lading, and an interstate common carrier. See, e.g., Drucker, 745 F. Supp. at 623.
Finally, implied private actions based on federal regulations are themselves a type of statutorybased private right of action. This is because the Supreme Court has declared that a private action
cannot be based on a federal regulation which creates an entirely new prohibition different from
the statute it was purporting to enforce. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001)
(“Language in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress through statutory
text created, but it may not create a right that Congress has not.”).
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on statutes today, originated as a principle of the common law having
nothing to do with statutes.
It rested on the English common law principle that for every legal right
there is a remedy.28 This meant that if a legal right already existed, then
a court had the power to fashion a remedy. This common law principle
was used by John Marshall to decide Marbury v. Madison.29 It was only
after the explosion of legislation in the early twentieth century30 that
statutes began to emerge as a foundation for implied private rights of
action.
Implied actions based on statutes have gone through several
identifiable eras of development. Each era either restricted or expanded
the availability of implied private rights of action. The first era was
transitional. It began with a 1916 case based on a common law claim of
negligence and a federal statute. In Texas & Pacific Railroad v. Rigsby,31
the common law provided an injured railroad employee with a cause of
action against his employer for negligence,32 while a federal statute
provided a duty of care.33
The transitional era was followed by an expansive era. This was a time
when private rights of action were “freely inferred” from federal
statutes.34 The height of the expansive era occurred in the 1960s when
the Supreme Court decided J.I. Case Co. v. Borak.35 In that case, the
28. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (1783).
29. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). In that case, the Secretary of State refused to deliver a judicial
commission to William Marbury. Justice Marshall found that Marbury had a legal right to his
commission. Id. at 162. Relying on William Blackstone’s famous treatise on the common law,
Marshall declared, “it is a general and indisputable rule that where there is a legal right, there is
also a legal remedy. . . .” Id. at 163 (citing BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at 23).
30. In a case decided in 1994, the Supreme Court wrote, “In this century, legislation has come
to supply the dominant means of legal ordering. . . .” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S 244,
272 (1994).
31. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
32. In a petition filed by the railroad employee plaintiff in the Fifth Circuit on Oct. 9, 1913,
Count II states that “the said defendant was negligent in not having the said hold or grab securely
fastened to the said car, and that by reason of such negligence, the same gave way and threw the
plaintiff to the ground.” (on file with author).
33. The worker was injured after he fell off a box car because of a defective hand hold. The
Federal Safety Appliance Act provided that railroad cars shall “be equipped with secure hand
holds. . . .” Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 37. The fact that the statute was enacted for the benefit of a particular
class was legally significant because it triggered “a common-law tradition” which “regarded the
denial of a remedy as the exception rather than the rule.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374–75 (1982).
34. Long Term Care Pharmacy All. v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2004).
35. 377 U.S. 426 (1964), abrogated by Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). The 1960s was
popularly known as the Civil Rights era. About this expansive era, Justice Rehnquist wrote,
“Congress, at least during the period of the enactment of the several Titles of the Civil Rights Act
tended to rely to a large extent on the courts to decide whether there should be a private right of
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Court announced that courts had the ability, indeed even the duty, to
create new implied private rights of action, and that these actions could
be based on the broad ground of legislative purpose.36 This was an
extraordinary decision because of the breadth of judicial lawmaking
power that the Supreme Court appeared to sanction.37
After its opinion in Borak, the Supreme Court’s acceptance of implied
private rights of action became more grudging. The judicial stage was
now set for the more restrictive approach of Cort v. Ash.38 In Cort, the
Supreme Court developed a four-factor test to determine whether a
private action could be implied from a federal statute.39
This four-factor test underwent significant reconstruction at the hands
of the Supreme Court in 1979, and the factor of legislative intent emerged
as the “central inquiry.”40 Although they were weakened—and seemed
to be only a shadow of their formerly lively selves—Cort’s other factors
survived, along with additional factors, which the remainder of this
Article will discuss.41
III. FACTORS USED TO DETERMINE WHETHER A PRIVATE ACTION WILL
BE IMPLIED FROM A FEDERAL STATUTE
Other than Cort’s weakened four factors, no precise test has been
articulated to determine whether a federal court will imply a private
action from a federal statute. Nevertheless, the following factors have
consistently emerged as guidelines for the creation of implied private
rights of action. In reviewing these factors, it is important to note that not
all factors are weighed equally. The “legislative intent” factor, along with
the “rights creating” factor, are the most significant. The following
factors are presented chronologically, not in order of their significance.
action, rather than determining this question for itself.” Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 718
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (italics in original) (underlining added).
36. Borak, 377 U.S. at 433 (“[I]t is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as
are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.”) (emphasis added).
37. About Borak, one district court remarked that, “the Borak approach is viewed as the least
restrictive approach in determining whether a private cause of action may be discerned from a
statute.” Landegger v. Cohen, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1284–85 (D. Colo. 2013) (emphasis in original).
38. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
39. These factors are: (1) whether the plaintiff is part of a class “for whose special benefit the
statute was enacted[;]” (2) whether there is an indication of any legislative intent to deny or create
such a remedy; (3) whether the remedy would be consistent with the “underlying purposes” of the
legislation; and (4) whether the subject of the cause of action was one “traditionally relegated to
state law” so that it would be inappropriate to imply a new action based on federal law. Id. at 78.
40. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979).
41. Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Cases subsequent to Cort
have recognized that all four factors may be important, but the determinative question is whether
Congress intended to create a private right of action in favor of the plaintiff.”).
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We begin with the type of statute that the plaintiff has chosen to rely on.
A. FACTOR ONE: Type of Statute
1. Prohibitory Statutes Favored; Disclosure and Recordkeeping Statutes
Not Favored
A court is more likely to base an implied private right of action on a
prohibitory statute, rather than a disclosure statute. Title IX is a
prohibitory statute which the Supreme Court has held “implies a private
right of action to enforce its prohibition on intentional sex
discrimination.”42 The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)43 is a
disclosure statute. When a plaintiff tried to use FOIA as the basis for an
implied private right of action, the Supreme Court refused, emphasizing
that FOIA is “exclusively a disclosure statute.”44 Recordkeeping statutes
are also disfavored. This is because recordkeeping statutes, like
disclosure statutes, do not contain standards of conduct which a private
action could enforce.45 For example, a statute which simply imposed a
recordkeeping requirement on a business could not provide the basis for
an implied private action because it proscribed “no conduct as
unlawful.”46
2. Spending Clause Statutes Disfavored
A court is also less likely to imply a private right of action from a
spending clause statute. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(“FERPA”) is a spending clause statute.47 In 2002, after first noting that
recent decisions “have rejected attempts to infer enforceable rights from
Spending Clause statutes,”48 the Supreme Court refused to allow a
plaintiff to use FERPA to bring a claim under an implied right of action
theory.49
The reluctance of a court to make an implied action available under a
Spending Clause statute is based, in part, on the contractual nature of this

42. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005) (citing Cannon v. Univ. of
Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 690–93 (1979)).
43. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
44. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979).
45. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 424 (1975).
46. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979).
47. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 278 (2002) (“Congress enacted FERPA under its
spending power to condition the receipt of federal funds on certain requirements relating to the
access and disclosure of student educational records.”).
48. Id. at 281.
49. Id. at 286.
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type of legislation.50 Acceptance of the terms of a contract cannot be
knowing51 if one party to the contract is unaware of new conditions that
might be imposed on it through the judicial creation of an implied private
action.
The contractual nature of spending clause legislation also has practical
implications for implied private right of action plaintiffs. This is because
it can limit the type of relief a plaintiff can obtain. 52 For example, when
a plaintiff asked the Supreme Court to imply a remedy for punitive
damages from a spending clause statute, the Court refused.53 It did so
because punitive damages are “not normally available” in a contract
action.54 Finally, it is important to note that simply because a statute is
characterized as a spending statute is not by itself determinative of
whether a court will imply a private action.55
3. Jurisdictional Statutes Cannot Provide the Basis for an Implied
Private Right of Action
At one time, the Supreme Court appeared to suggest that a private right
of action could be implied from a jurisdictional provision.56 This is not
the law today. The Court has flatly rejected the idea that a jurisdictional
provision, standing alone, can provide the basis for an implied private
right of action.57 Instead, the source of a plaintiff’s action must be found
“in the substantive provisions” of the statute the plaintiff is trying to

50. Spending Clause legislation is “in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the
States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); see also Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct.
1378, 1387 (2015) (echoing Pennhurst in analyzing Medicaid funds).
51. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 (“The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the
spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the
‘contract.’”).
52. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) (“Although we have been careful not to
imply that all contract-law rules apply to Spending Clause legislation, . . . we have regularly
applied the contract-law analogy in cases defining the scope of conduct for which funding
recipients may be held liable for money damages.”) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted); but
see David E. Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of the Federal Spending Power, 52 S.D. L. REV. 496,
497 (2007) (“[A]cceptance or rejection of this [contract] thesis . . . has split the Justices into two
essentially equal camps. . . .”).
53. Barnes, 536 U.S. at 189.
54. Id. at 188.
55. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1994) (Title IX is a spending clause statute).
56. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (Section 27 of the Securities Exchange
Act grants district courts jurisdiction “of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce
any liability or duty created by this title.”).
57. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979) (plaintiff’s source of
remedy must be found in the substantive provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, not the
jurisdictional provisions).
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enforce.58 The reason that jurisdictional provisions cannot provide the
basis for an implied private action is because they create no cause of
action and impose no liability.59
4. Civil Statutes Preferable to Criminal Statutes
Not only will courts refuse to imply a private right of action from a
jurisdictional statute, courts are also reluctant, but not always opposed,
to imply a private right of action from a criminal statute.60 There are two
reasons for this. First, criminal statutes are designed to benefit the public
at large and not a particular class.61 Second, they do not ordinarily “confer
a right to a person.”62
B. FACTOR TWO: Statute Must Identify a Particular Group it is
Designed to Benefit; Criminal Statutes and General Regulatory Statutes
Often Fail to Satisfy This Requirement
Criminal statutes are not favored as sources of implied private actions
because they fail to satisfy a requirement of implied private rights of
action analysis. This is the requirement that a statute must expressly
identify a specific group that the statute is designed to benefit.63
General regulatory statutes also fail to satisfy this requirement. In fact,
the Court has “come to view the implication of private remedies in
regulatory statutes with increasing disfavor.”64 This is because regulatory
statutes, like criminal statutes, are usually enacted for the general public;
they are not enacted for the benefit of a specific class. For example, in
refusing to engraft a private right of action onto the Rivers and Harbors
Act, the Supreme Court found that the language in the statute was not

58. See id.
59. See AT&T v. M/V Cape Fear, 967 F.2d 864, 869 (3d Cir. 1992) (provision controlling
jurisdiction, venue, or service of process creates no private cause of action).
60. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994) (“We
have been quite reluctant to infer a private right of action from a criminal prohibition alone. . . .”);
see also Concert v. Luzerne Cty. Children & Youth Servs., No. 3:CV-08-1340, 2008 WL 4753709,
at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2008) (“Criminal statutes do not generally provide a private cause of action
nor basis for civil liability.”).
61. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979).
62. See Jones v. Lockett, No. 08-16, 2009 WL 2232812, at *8 (W.D. Pa. July 23, 2009) (“It is
clear that the criminal statutes invoked by Plaintiff . . . do not provide for a private cause of action.
In other words, those statutes do not confer a right to a person.”).
63. For example, after two ships broke one of AT&T’s underwater cables, AT&T tried to bring
an implied private right of action against the vessels based on the Submarine Cable Act. The Third
Circuit refused. AT&T, 967 F.2d at 867. It characterized the Cable Act as “primarily criminal in
nature,” making it a misdemeanor to break an underwater cable. It contains no more than a general
proscription and does not “focus on any particular class of beneficiaries. . . .” Id. (citation omitted).
64. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P., 286 F.3d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002).
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intended to benefit a particular class.65 Instead, “it was intended to benefit
the public at large through a general regulatory scheme. . . .”66 Similarly,
in denying a private right of action to an airline passenger under the Air
Deregulation Act (“ADA”), a federal court based its decision on the fact
that “ADA provisions do not expressly identify domestic air passengers
as a class that Congress intended to benefit.”67
C. FACTOR THREE: The Statute Relied on Must Confer a “Right” on
the Plaintiff
In addition to benefiting a particular class, for a statute to provide the
basis of an implied private right of action the statute must create “a federal
right in favor of the plaintiff.” 68 So important is this “rights-creating”
factor that if a court determines at the outset that the statute at issue
confers no substantive right, then it will not go on to the question of
whether there is an implied private cause of action.69
Courts have looked at the following characteristics to determine
whether a statute creates the necessary federal right to support an implied
private right of action: (a) whether the statute contains individual rights;
(b) whether the focus of the statute is on the individual protected, not the
entity regulated; and (c) whether the right is definite and specific. Each
characteristic will be discussed below.
1. Statute Must Create an Individual Right
The first characteristic a court will look at is whether the statute
contains any rights at all. If a statute provides “no indication that
Congress intends to create new individual rights, there is no basis
for . . . an implied right of action.”70
For example, when a plaintiff tried to bring an implied private right of
action under the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the Eleventh
Circuit began its opinion by announcing, “We begin by looking to the
text of [the statute] for rights-creating language.”71 The court noted that,
while a statute that includes words like “no person shall be denied the
right to vote” does contain the necessary rights-creating language,72 the
65. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297–98 (1980).
66. Id. at 297–98 (emphasis added).
67. Casas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 304 F.3d 517, 522 n.8 (5th Cir. 2002).
68. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); see also Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135
S. Ct. 1378, 1387 (2015) (“Section 30(A) [of the Medicaid Act] lacks the sort of rights-creating
language needed to imply a private right of action.”) (emphasis added).
69. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 n.21 (1981).
70. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 286 (2002).
71. Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 801 F.3d 1278, 1296 (11th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 1296–97 (citing Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 555–57 (1969)).
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Gaming Act contains no rights-creating language. Therefore, the statute
cannot be used to provide the basis for an implied private right of action.73
The same rights-creating factor was emphasized by the Supreme Court in
Alexander v. Sandoval.74 The Sandoval case involved an attempt to bring
a private cause of action based on a regulation to enforce a section of Title
VI.75 The Court refused to imply a private action because it was “clear
that the ‘rights creating’ language so critical” to the creation of an implied
private action was absent from the section.76
A federal court reached the opposite conclusion in Indiana Protection
and Advocacy Services v. Indiana Family and Social Services
Administration.77 In that case, the Seventh Circuit decided that the
Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act
(“PAIMI Act”) could be enforced by an implied private action. Unlike
the statute in Sandoval, the statutory language in the PAIMI Act directly
granted rights to the “plaintiff here.”78
2. The Focus of the Statute Must Be on the Individuals Protected, Not
on the Entity Regulated
A second characteristic a court will look at to determine whether the
statutory language is sufficient to provide the necessary individual “right”
is whether the focus of the statute is on the entity regulated, rather than
the person protected. For example, in denying a private right of action to
a worker under the Davis-Bacon Act,79 the Supreme Court found that,
although the Act required that provisions be put into federal construction
contracts to benefit “laborers,” the requirement did “not confer rights
directly on those individuals.”80 Similarly, a federal court refused to
imply a private action under the Indian Open Dump Cleanup Act because
the statute simply created “agency obligations.”81 The statute did not
“focus on the rights of protected parties.”82

73. See id. at 1297.
74. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
75. See id. at 278 (“[This] case presents the question whether private individuals may sue to
enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”).
76. Id. at 288.
77. 603 F.3d 365, 383 (7th Cir. 2010).
78. Id. at 378 (“Unlike the statute[] in Sandoval . . . the PAIMI Act’s key language is not
directed at an administrator . . . Instead, the Act directly grants rights and powers to the . . . plaintiff
here.”).
79. Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 3141 (2006) et seq.
80. Univs. Research Ass’n, Inc. v. Corfu, 450 U.S. 754, 772 (1981).
81. El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. United States, 750 F.3d 863, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussing 25
U.S.C. § 3901 et seq.).
82. Id. (finding “no right of action can be implied in the [Indian Open Dump Cleanup Act]”).
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In short, if a federal statute merely imposes a duty on an entity or an
agency, but fails to create any rights in favor of the plaintiff, then a court
will ordinarily refuse to imply a private right of action. Indeed, one
federal court concluded that “the right- or duty-creating language of the
statute has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of
implication of a cause of action.”83
3. The Right Must Be Definite and Specific
A third characteristic a court will look at to determine whether the
statute at issue contains the necessary “right” is whether the so-called
right is definite and specific.
Only unambiguously conferred rights can provide the basis for an
implied cause of action.84 Statutory language which consists of vague
words like “decent, safe, and sanitary” is not sufficiently definite.85 Such
language suggests that “Congress did not intend to create a judicially
enforceable right.”86
As the discussion above indicates, there is no easy solution to the
problem of deciding whether a statute creates the necessary “right” to
support an implied private action. Before leaving this section, it is
important to note that, in looking for cases to support the existence of a
federal right, the same cases used to determine the existence of a federal
right for purposes of establishing a statutory “right” under 42 U.S.C. §
198387 can also be used to support the existence of a statutory “right” for
purposes of creating an implied private right of action.88

83. La. Landmarks Soc., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 85 F.3d 1119, 1124 (5th Cir. 1996).
Earlier, the same court found that the statute at issue “‘creates no rights in favor of individuals’ but
rather, it ‘imposes duties on a federal agency. . . .’” Id. (citing Abate v. S. Pac. Trans. Co., 928 F.2d
167, 169 (5th Cir. 1991)).
84. Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) (“We now reject the notion that our cases permit
anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under
§1983 . . . we further reject the notion that our implied right of action cases are separate and distinct
from our §1983 cases.”).
85. See Banks v. Dall. Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that the Supreme
Court finds “statutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected create
no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of persons”) (internal citation
omitted).
86. Id.
87. More than a hundred years after 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted, the Supreme Court expanded
the scope of protections afforded under § 1983 to include violations of federal statutory law, as well
as constitutional law. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). However, the Court also ruled that
for a statutory claim to go forward, the plaintiff in a § 1983 action must assert the defendant’s
violation of “a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S.
329, 340 (1997) (emphasis in original).
88. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283 (“[O]ur implied right of action cases should guide the
determination of whether a statute confers rights enforceable under § 1983.”). The Court went on
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D. FACTOR FOUR: The Conduct of the Defendant Must Be Intentional
Turning from statutory language to potential defendants, liability for a
private right of action will be imposed only if the action of a defendant is
intentional. Mere negligence is not enough to support an implied private
right of action. For example, intent is a necessary element of any implied
private action brought under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.89
Intent is also an element of the private action created by the Court under
Title IX to prohibit discrimination in education.90 Liability can only
attach if a school intentionally acts in violation of Title IX. 91 Liability
cannot be imposed against any school vicariously, or through
imputation.92
E. FACTOR FIVE: “Remediless”
A court will be more likely to create an implied private action in a case
where a plaintiff lacks any remedy at all. To deny a plaintiff an implied
private action in such a situation would leave such a plaintiff
“remediless.” The remediless factor can appear in two contexts.
1. Remediless Factor Arising from Agency Failure to Enforce an
Existing Statutory Remedy
The first context arises in a situation where a remedy exists, but the
government agency tasked with enforcing a statute refuses to do so.
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools93 provides an example of the
Supreme Court deciding to imply a private remedy from a federal statute
after the public agency tasked with enforcing it failed to do so. The
Franklin case arose when a 14-year-old female student was repeatedly
and brazenly94 sexually assaulted by a teacher/coach. The Court allowed
the student to seek damages, based on an implied private right of action

to declare that: “[T]he initial inquiry—determining whether a statute confers any right at all [under
§1983]—is no different from the initial inquiry in an implied private right of action case. . . .” Id.
at 285 (emphasis added).
89. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (“§10(b) [of the Securities Exchange
Act] . . . cannot be read to impose liability for negligent conduct alone.”).
90. See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 642 (1999) (finding an intentional
violation of Title IX does not bar a private cause of action); see also Hunter ex. rel. Hunter v.
Barnstable Sch. Comm., 456 F. Supp. 2d 255, 265 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2006) (“deliberate indifference”
standard is met when school system intentionally violates Title IX).
91. Hunter, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 265.
92. Davis, 526 U.S. at 642.
93. 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992).
94. Id. at 63 (three times the coach “interrupted a class, requested that the teacher excuse [the
student] and took her to a private office where he subjected her to coercive intercourse.”).
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theory, since any other approach would have left her “remediless.”95
The student was indeed remediless. Although she complained to her
school’s administrators, not only did the school fail to take substantive
action, one school official attempted to dissuade her from pursuing any
complaint at all!96 Of even more significance was the fact that the Office
of Civil Rights of the Department of Education, the federal agency
charged with enforcing Title IX’s gender discrimination ban, closed its
investigation once the teacher resigned.97 Remarkably, the agency
decided to close its investigation even though the agency itself had
reached the conclusion that the student’s rights had been violated.98
2. Remediless Factor Arising from the Fact That a Statute Contains No
Remedy at All
The second context in which the remediless factor can arise is in a
situation where a statute contains no remedy at all. 99 A court is more
likely to imply a private action under a rights-creating statute that
contains no enforcement mechanism. For example, when shareholders of
a bank asked a court to imply a private right of action under the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, the federal court agreed.100 The court examined
the statutory scheme and found that there was no means to enforce its
provisions “apart from an implied private right of action.”101 The court
went on to hold that where Congress failed to provide an enforcement
mechanism, “it is appropriate to infer that Congress did not intend to
enact unenforceable requirements. Thus, it is fair to imply a private right
of action from the statute at issue.”102
Similarly, in an earlier case involving a statute which prohibited unions

95. Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 64. The lower court opinion tells the story. Franklin v. Gwinnett City. Pub. Sch., 911
F.2d 617, 618 (11th Cir. 1990) (After the student reported the teacher to school authorities, another
teacher “tried to discourage her from pursuing the matter by talking to her about the negative
publicity. . . . [The second teacher also contacted the student’s boyfriend] in an effort to enlist his
assistance to discourage Franklin from pursuing the matter.”), rev’d, 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
97. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 64 n.3.
98. Id. (Although the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Education, (OCR) “concluded
that the school district had violated the student’s rights by subjecting her to physical and verbal
sexual harassment and by interfering with her right to complain . . . [OCR] terminated its
investigation.”).
99. Wisniewski v. Rodale, Inc., 510 F.3d 294, 297 (3rd Cir. 2007) (Some federal statutes
“merely define rights and duties, and are silent about whether an individual may bring suit to
enforce them. For some statutes in this latter category, courts have held that ‘implied’ private rights
of action exist.”).
100. See First Pac. Bancorp, Inc. v. Helfer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000).
101. Id. at 1126.
102. Id.
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from discriminating against minority workers, the Supreme Court
“judicially implied” a remedy.103 The Court declared that where statutory
duties are in the form of commands, and there is an “absence of any
available administrative remedy,” the only mode of enforcement is the
courts.104
F. FACTOR SIX: Type of Remedy Sought
A federal court is more likely to imply a private action if the plaintiff
is seeking equitable relief, rather than money damages. For example, in
deciding to imply a private right of action for accounting in favor of a
bank’s shareholders, the Ninth Circuit pointed to the fact that the remedy
plaintiff shareholders were seeking was “an equitable one, an
accounting.”105 The court went on to declare that “because the remedy at
hand is an equitable one, we are more inclined to perceive in Congress’
silence a presumption that an individual may pursue a claim.”106
G. FACTOR SEVEN: Federalism: Whether the Claim Involves an Area
That is Normally Relegated to State Law
A court is less likely to create a private right of action from a federal
statute if the subject matter is one traditionally regulated by state law.107
Family law is a traditional area of state law. In Thompson v.
Thompson,108 the Supreme Court refused to recognize an implied private
right of action involving a custody dispute under the federal Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act.109 The Court declared that allowing a parent
to bring an implied private right of action under the Kidnapping Act
would entangle federal courts in an area of “traditional state-law
103. Steele v. Louisville Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 207 (1944). The Supreme Court later
determined, “The right to bring unfair representation actions is judicially ‘implied from the statute
and the policy which it has adopted’ . . . and Congress has not specified what remedies are available
in these suits.” Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979) (citing Steele, 323 U.S.
at 204).
104. Steele, 323 U.S. at 207.
105. First Pac. Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1125.
106. Id.; see also Note, Private Rights of Action—Equitable Remedies to Enforce the Medicaid
Act—Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 129 HARV. L. REV. 211, 215–16 (2015) (“As its
private-rights-of-action doctrine has evolved, the Court has drawn distinctions among different
remedies. . . . In suits for damages under federal statutes . . . the Court has applied a skeptical
approach. . . . Yet in suits for equitable relief, the approach has remained broad and
permissive. . . .”).
107. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (If a cause of action is “traditionally relegated to state
law, . . . then it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law.”).
108. 484 U.S. 174, 187 (1988) (analyzing a possible private right of action under 28 U.S.C. §
1738A).
109. Id. (There is a “conclusive case against inferring a cause of action in federal court to
determine which of two conflicting state custody decrees is valid.”) (emphasis added).
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questions” which they “have little expertise to resolve.”110
Landlord-tenant law is another traditional area of state law. When a
plaintiff tried to bring an implied private right of action based on a
housing statute, a federal court refused on the ground that states have a
great interest in the area of landlord-tenant law.111
H. FACTOR EIGHT: Interference with Statutory Purpose
A court is less likely to recognize a new private action if it would
interfere with the purpose of a statute. For example, in National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers,112 the
Court refused to imply a private right of action in favor of a railroad
passenger who wanted to challenge a route reduction plan under the Rail
Passenger Service Act.113 The Court found that the purpose of the statute
was to eliminate uneconomic train routes. Permitting passengers to bring
private rights of action would hurt the overall statutory purpose.114
Similarly, when a cable operator sought to imply a private right of action
that would have allowed him to prevent another cable operator from
providing service, a federal court refused.115 The court explained that the
purpose of the Act was “to promote competition,” and allowing an
incumbent cable operator to bring a private action against a new entrant
might thwart competition.116
I. FACTOR NINE: Accomplishment of Statutory Purpose
The factor of statutory purpose is a double-edged sword. In addition to
being used to deny an implied private right of action, “purpose” can also
be used as a factor in support of the creation of an implied private right
of action. For example, when bank shareholders asked a federal court to
imply a private right of action under the Federal Reserve Act, the court
noted that an important inquiry in deciding the case was whether
implying a new remedy “is consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme.”117
110. Id. at 186.
111. See Jefferies v. District of Columbia, 917 F. Supp. 2d 10, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting an
inconsistency with any federal legislative scheme “to imply a private cause of action where the
legal right invoked is one traditionally left to state law. It would be hard to find an area of law in
which states have a greater interest . . . than in the legal area of landlord-tenant.”) (internal citation
omitted).
112. 414 U.S. 453, 465 (1974).
113. 45 U.S.C. §§ 501–02 (repealed 1994).
114. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 463 (1974).
115. San Juan Cable LLC v. P.R. Tel. Co., 612 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2010).
116. Id. at 31.
117. First Pac. Bancorp, Inc. v. Helfer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000).
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However, it is important to note that statutory purpose alone cannot be
used to create an implied private right of action. The Court abandoned
the “legislative purpose” theory as the sole basis for implied private right
of action analysis some time ago in favor of a theory based on legislative
intent.118
J. FACTOR TEN: Requirement of Legislative Intent: Enforcement
Provisions Already Contained in a Statute as an Indicator of Legislative
Intent
No matter how strong a case can be made that an implied private right
of action will further a statutory purpose, a court will not imply a private
right of action from a federal statute unless it can be demonstrated that
Congress intended to create a private right of action.119 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has declared legislative intent to be the central inquiry.120
Unfortunately, no precise test has been developed to determine legislative
intent. What there is instead are indicators of legislative intent. A primary
indicator of legislative intent has already been discussed. This is whether
the statute contains rights-creating language.121 In addition to rightscreating language, enforcement provisions already present in a statute can
also provide an indication of legislative intent.
Examples of enforcement provisions which can provide an indication
of legislative intent are: (a) whether the statute provides an express
private right of action in one section, but not in another; (b) whether the
statute at issue already provides a comprehensive and detailed
enforcement mechanism; and (c) whether the statute at issue delegates
enforcement to a federal agency. Each of these “enforcement” indicators
will be discussed below.
1. Indication of Legislative Intent: Express Private Right of Action
Already Contained in Other Parts of the Statute at Issue
One indication of legislative intent is whether the statute that Congress

118. Lest there be any doubt about the viability of statutory purpose as the sole basis for an
implied private right of action today, the Court has characterized statutory purpose analysis as
something we “abandoned” forty years ago. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001); see
also Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co. of N.J., 283 F.3d 429, 434 (2d Cir. 2002) (describing statutory
purpose, in the context of implied private right of action analysis, as something belonging to an
“ancien regime”).
119. See Bellikoff v. Eaton Vance Corp., 481 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Congressional
intent is the keystone as to whether a federal private right of action exists for a federal statute.”).
120. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1102 (1991) (“[R]ecognition of any
private right of action for violating a federal statute must ultimately rest on congressional intent to
provide a private remedy.”) (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979)).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 68–86.
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enacted already contains an express private means of enforcement.122
This would appear to indicate that Congress did not intend to leave open
the possibility of the implied addition of another private remedy. 123 For
example, when the Ninth Circuit refused to imply a private right of action
under Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it noted that Congress had
already expressly created a private right of action under Section 306 of
the same Act.124 The court went on to declare that, “we cannot find in
Congress’ silence in section 304 an intent to create a private right of
action where it was not silent in creating such a right . . . in other sections
of the same Act.”125
Similarly, when a cable operator asked a federal court to imply a
private right of action under section 541(b)(1) of the Cable
Communications Policy Act, the court refused.126 The court found it
“particularly noteworthy” that Congress provided a private right of action
in an adjacent provision of the same statute.127
2. Indication of Legislative Intent: Statute Already Contains a Detailed
Enforcement Mechanism That Expressly Prescribes Other Remedies
The presence of an elaborate enforcement mechanism in a statute also
tends to contradict any legislative intent to create additional private
remedies. For example, in a case involving the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act128 and the Marine Mammal Protection Act,129 the Supreme
Court announced that, in view of the “elaborate enforcement provisions”
each statute contained, “it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to
authorize by implication additional judicial remedies for private
citizens. . . .”130
In short, if a statute already contains a comprehensive enforcement
scheme, then this becomes a factor in discerning legislative intent.131
122. Winding Creek Solar LLC v. Peevey, No. 13-cv-04934-JD, 2015 WL 675388, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 17, 2015) (“[T]he existence of [] express remedies demonstrates . . . that Congress
intended to foreclose implied private actions. . . .”) (alteration in original).
123. City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 121 (2005).
124. In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d 1223, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 2008).
125. Id. at 1233.
126. San Juan Cable LLC v. P.R. Tel. Co., 612 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2010).
127. Id. at 30.
128. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–75 (2012).
129. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401–45 (2012).
130. See Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981);
see also Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981) (“The presumption
that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a
comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement.”).
131. See Wisniewski v. Rodale, Inc., 510 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 2007) (exploring possible
boundaries for determining congressional intent).
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Similarly, if a statute “expressly prescribes other remedies,” then this also
“belies congressional intent to create an implied right of action. . . .”132
3. Indication of Legislative Intent: Statute Delegates Enforcement to a
Federal Agency
Another indicator of legislative intent is whether a statute has
delegated enforcement to a federal agency. In Acara v. Banks,133 a court
held that the Affordable Care Act could not provide patients with an
implied private right of action to remedy improper disclosure of their
medical records because the Act delegated enforcement to the
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”).134 The court found
the specific delegation to HHS to be a “strong indication that Congress
intended to preclude private enforcement.”135
Finally, it is important to emphasize that delegating enforcement to a
federal agency is not conclusive of a congressional intent to preclude
private actions. For example, as the beginning of this Article noted,
although the SEC is the agency charged with enforcing various securities
laws, implied private actions have been allowed to play a significant role
alongside the agency’s own enforcement actions.136
K. FACTOR ELEVEN: Presumption Against the Creation of an Implied
Private Right of Action
The reason that legislative intent must be established as the foundation
for an implied private right of action is not only because of the obvious
separation of powers issue (courts are not supposed to “usurp” Congress’
power to legislate),137 but also because of the presumption against the

132. Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 801 F.3d 1278, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015).
133. 470 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2006).
134. Id. at 571 (“The express provision of one method of enforcing [a statute] suggests that
Congress intended to preclude others.”) (alteration in original) (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001)).
135. Id. It should be noted that an indication that Congress intended to preclude private
enforcement becomes particularly strong when a statute delegates enforcement to a federal agency
with expertise in a complex area. Such a complex area is rate setting for reimbursement to providers
of Medicaid services. In Armstrong, which involved an attempt by providers to bring a private
enforcement action “to enjoin unlawful executive action,” the Supreme Court refused private
enforcement of the relevant statute. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378,
1385 (2015). The Court found that “[t]he sheer complexity associated with enforcing §
30(A) . . . shows that the Medicaid Act precludes private enforcement of § 30(A) in the courts.” Id.
(emphasis added).
136. See supra note 12.
137. See In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d 1223, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In
the absence of clear evidence of congressional intent, we may not usurp the legislative power by
unilaterally creating a cause of action.”).
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creation of new private actions. 138
A plaintiff seeking to imply a private action today has the burden of
proof to overcome the presumption against the judicial creation of new
implied actions.139 The old presumption in favor of the implication of
new private actions has been discarded.140 A new “presumption against
implying private rights comes into play” today.141 Unless a plaintiff can
offer evidence of congressional intent, the presumption will not be
overcome. 142
L. FACTOR TWELVE: Congressional Silence, or Acquiescence,
Cannot Be Used as a Substitute for Legislative Intent
1. Silence
The Supreme Court has declared that where a statute is “silent on the
question of a private remedy, ‘implying a private right of action on the
basis of congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise, at best.’”143
Other courts have observed that legislative silence is not enough. Instead,
a plaintiff seeking to have a court imply a private action must provide
evidence of legislative intent. For example, one court noted that
“legislative silence is often encountered in implied right of action
cases . . . [b]ut unless this congressional intent can be inferred from the
language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the
essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not
exist.”144
2. The Acquiescence Doctrine
Similarly, congressional acquiescence cannot provide the basis for an
138. See San Juan Cable LLC v. P.R. Tel. Co., 612 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2010) (“The baseline
rule is that a federal statute ordinarily should be read as written, in effect creating a presumption
against importing, by implication, a private right of action. This de facto presumption has
considerable bite; it ‘can be overcome only by compelling evidence of a contrary congressional
intent.’”) (quoting Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 68 (1st Cir. 2002)).
139. See, e.g., Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 571 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[P]laintiff has the relatively
heavy burden to show Congress intended private enforcement, and must overcome the presumption
that Congress did not intend to create a private cause of action.”).
140. Long Term Care Pharmacy All. v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Private
rights of action were once freely inferred from federal statutes . . . but the ready inference in favor
of private enforcement no longer applies.”).
141. United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 197 (5th Cir. 2001).
142. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017) (“[W]hen deciding whether to recognize
an implied cause of action, the ‘determinative’ question is one of statutory intent.”).
143. Till v. Unifirst Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 653 F.2d 152, 160 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979)).
144. Baker v. Montgomery Cty., 50 A.3d 1112, 1125 (Md. 2012) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981)).
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implied private right of action either. For example, in Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,145 plaintiffs argued that, since
Congress had failed to amend certain securities laws to provide that a
cause of action for aiding and abetting was not available, then Congress
had acquiesced to a judicially implied private cause of action recognized
by some lower federal courts. The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act146 could not provide the basis for
an implied private right of action for aiding and abetting. 147 In making its
ruling, the Court declared: “[O]ur observations on the acquiescence
doctrine indicate its limitations as an expression of congressional
intent. . . . ‘Congress may legislate, moreover, only through the passage
of a bill . . . Congressional inaction cannot amend a duly enacted
statute.’”148
M. FACTOR THIRTEEN: Agency Position in Favor of Implication
Another factor, although a minor one, is whether the federal agency
charged with enforcing the statute at issue is in favor of implication. For
example, when the Court decided to imply a private right of action under
Title IX, it noted that the department which administered the statute had
taken the position that a private cause of action should be implied.149 It
is important to note that courts do not always give weight to an agency’s
position. Courts are supposed to decide cases based on legislative intent,
not what the agency charged with enforcing a statute thinks. For example,
although the SEC filed an amicus brief in support of a plaintiff who
sought to establish an implied private action for aiding and abetting,150
the Supreme Court refused to imply a private right of action.151
N. FACTOR FOURTEEN: Cause of Action or Remedy
Courts are more reluctant to imply a brand new cause of action than to
imply a remedy for a cause of action that already exists. For this reason,

145. 511 U.S. 164, 186 (1994).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
147. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 191 (“Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit
aiding and abetting, we hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit
under § 10(b).”).
148. Id. at 186 (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175, n.1 (1989))
(emphasis added), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1074.
149. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 686, 687 (1979).
150. Brief for the Securities Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 5, Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994)
(No. 92-854), 1993 WL 13006275, at *5.
151. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 191.
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a plaintiff seeking to have a court imply a remedy should say so. For
example, when a plaintiff asked the Third Circuit to imply a private action
for contribution, the court began by declaring that, “we must determine
if a right of contribution is a right of action in itself or whether it is a
remedy.”152 In that particular case, the plaintiff strenuously argued that
he was merely seeking a remedy.153 The court observed that by
characterizing an action for contribution as a remedy, the plaintiff was
trying to avail himself of “the principle that once a right and cause of
action are established, the federal courts are empowered broadly to award
any appropriate relief.”154
O. FACTOR FIFTEEN: Public Defendant as a Factor
Whether the defendant is a government entity is another factor that
determines if a court will imply a private action. Implying a cause of
action against a government entity is dramatically different from seeking
to imply an action against a private defendant.155 This is because the
immunities available to a government entity, as well as the restricted
remedies available against a government entity, differ significantly from
those available to and against a private party.
1. The United States Enjoys Immunity from Suit Under the Doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity
As a general rule, “the United States enjoys immunity from suit.”156
The origin of this immunity is the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 157
What this means, as a practical matter, is that unless a plaintiff can
produce a statutory waiver of immunity, any action naming the United
States as a defendant will fail.158 This is because the United States cannot
152. Bowers v. NCAA, 346 F.3d 402, 419 (3d Cir. 2003).
153. Id. (“Temple argues that the right of contribution is a remedy.”).
154. Id. at 420. Characterization of whether a plaintiff is seeking a new right of action, or a
remedy, will not necessarily determine the outcome. See id. (“[T]his case should not turn on our
characterization of the nature of contribution as the Supreme Court has not determined whether
contribution is available by clearly distinguishing among rights, rights of action, and remedies.”).
155. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 291 n.8 (2011) (“[R]emedies against the government
differ from ‘general remedies principles’ applicable to private litigants.”).
156. Roman-Cancel v. United States, 613 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2010).
157. Muirhead v. Mecham, 427 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2005) (“It is beyond cavil that, as the
sovereign, the United States is immune from suit without its consent.”) (emphasis added). Gregory
C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity and Money Claims
against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 606 (2003) (“The concept of ‘sovereign
immunity’—that is, the immunity of the federal government from suit without its express
permission . . . underlies and permeates the subject of litigation against the federal government.”).
158. In deciding whether a statutory waiver exists, three factors should be taken into account.
First, there is a “general rule that ‘a waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity will be strictly
construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.’” Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S.
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be sued without consent from Congress.159 Native American tribes within
the United States also enjoy sovereign immunity, and this can provide a
defense to an implied private right of action. For example, in Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez,160 the Supreme Court refused to imply a private right
of action under the federal Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”) because
“suits against the tribe under the ICRA are barred by its sovereign
immunity from suit.”161
2. The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity Applies to Federal Agencies
and to Federal Officials Acting in Their Official Capacities
Just as the United States cannot be sued, federal agencies and federal
officers acting in their official capacities cannot be sued either.162 This is
why the implied private right of action plaintiff in the famous Bivens v.
Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics163 case did not
name the Federal Bureau of Narcotics or the drug enforcement officers in
their official capacities as defendants. It is because “an action against a
federal agency or federal officers in their official capacities is essentially
a suit against the United States[.]”164 For a potential plaintiff, this means
that many public defendants are immune from suit.165
3. The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity Does Not Apply to Federal
Officials Sued in Their Personal Capacities
As indicated above, federal employees acting in their official
481, 491 (2006) (citation omitted). Second, jurisdictional statutes, standing alone, “do not operate
as waivers of sovereign immunity.” Munaco v. United States, 522 F.3d 651, 653 n.3 (6th Cir. 2008).
Third, a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied. Sossamon, 563 U.S. at 288 (citation
omitted).
159. Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 334 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Block v. North Dakota
ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983)); see also Williamson v. U.S. Dep’t
of Agric., 815 F.2d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting the United States is immune from suit except
when it consents).
160. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
161. Id. at 59.
162. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 191–92 (1996) (“equalization provision” of Rehabilitation
Act Amendments of 1986 does not indicate congressional intent to subject federal agencies to
liability for money damages); see also Griggs v. LaHood, 770 F. Supp. 2d 548, 551 (E.D.N.Y.
2011) (“[T]he federal government, and by extension, federal employees acting in their official
capacities, are entitled to absolute sovereign immunity from suit.”).
163. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The case held “the Fourth Amendment implies a private right of
action against government officials engaged in illegal searches.” See also John P. Cronan,
Comment Subjecting the Fourth Amendment to Intermediate Scrutiny: The Reasonableness of
Media Ride-Alongs, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 949, 951 n.16 (1999) (citing Bivens for the same
proposition).
164. Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasis
added).
165. Griggs, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 551–52.
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capacities enjoy sovereign immunity from suit. However, if a federal
employee is sued in his or her individual capacity, “sovereign immunity
does not apply.”166 This is why the federal agents in Bivens were only
named as defendants in their individual capacities.167
4. If the Defendant is a State, a Plaintiff Must Also Confront Sovereign
Immunity
Just as the United States enjoys sovereign immunity, each of the fifty
states also enjoy immunity from suit. A state enjoys two different species
of immunity. First is the Eleventh Amendment,168 which presents a bar
to an action against a state by a private individual in federal court.169
In addition to Eleventh Amendment immunity, states also enjoy “a
broader sovereign immunity, which applies against all private suits,
whether in state or federal court.”170 What this means for a private right
of action plaintiff is that, if the defendant is a state, the first issue the
plaintiff must face is whether the state has waived its sovereign
immunity.171 If it has not, then any implied private right of action case is
at an end. For example, in Sossamon v. Texas,172 a prisoner tried to bring
an implied private action against the State of Texas under the federal
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The Supreme
Court refused, holding that a private cause of action “does not include
suits for damages against a State.”173

166. Id. at 552.
167. In Bivens, the plaintiff sued the federal agents in their individual capacities as six unknown
agents. 403 U.S. at 391. “Bivens authorizes a private cause of action against federal officials in
their individual capacity who violate an individual’s constitutional rights while acting under color
of federal law.” Mullen v. Bureau of Prisons, 843 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing
Simpkins v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1997)) (emphasis added).
168. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit . . . commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State. . . . ”).
169. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (noting a state’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity can be abrogated by Congress in situations involving enforcement
of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (stating
that the Eleventh Amendment is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment).
170. Beaulieu v. Vermont, 807 F.3d 478, 483 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 713, 722 (1999) (discussing state sovereign immunity generally, including that beyond the
Eleventh Amendment).
171. Turner v. Boyle, 116 F. Supp. 3d 58, 73 (D. Conn. 2015) (“A suit generally may not be
maintained directly against the State itself, or against any agency or department of the State, unless
the State has waived its sovereign immunity.”) (quoting Fla. Dep’t of State v. Treasure Salvors,
Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 684 (1982)).
172. 563 U.S. 277 (2011).
173. Id. at 288.
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5. A State Agency, Which is an “Arm of the State,” Cannot Be Sued,
Nor Can the Agency’s Employees Acting in Their Official Capacities
Just as states cannot ordinarily be sued, most state agencies cannot be
sued either. Specifically, the Eleventh Amendment protects state
administrative agencies, which are “arms of the state,” from being sued.
For example, the Nevada State Bar Association is immune from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment because it was found to be an “arm of
the state.”174 Immunity also extends to state agency employees “acting in
their official capacities as agents of the state.”175
6. State Employees Sued in Their Individual Capacities May Be
Entitled to “Qualified” Immunity
Potential implied private right of action plaintiffs should be aware that
it makes a difference whether a state employee is sued in an official
capacity or in an individual capacity. While the Eleventh Amendment
provides a form of absolute immunity to state employees sued in their
official capacities, a state employee sued in his or her individual capacity
is only entitled to qualified immunity.176 Qualified immunity protects
public employees from liability for conduct the employee could not have
reasonably known would violate a “clearly established” constitutional or
statutory right.177 The purpose of qualified immunity is to give
“government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken
judgments. . . .”178
P. FACTOR SIXTEEN: Subject Matter as a Factor
In addition to the identity of the defendant, another factor courts look
to is subject matter. The hospitality of a court toward the creation of a

174. Mirch v. Beesely, 316 F. App’x 643, 643 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Fed. Mar. Comm’n v.
S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002) (affirming dismissal of an action against the South
Carolina States Port Authority (“SCSPA”) on sovereign immunity grounds after finding that the
SCSPA was an “arm of the State of South Carolina”). It is important to note that the determination
of whether a state agency is an “arm of the state” is a matter of federal law, not state law. Pub. Sch.
Ret. Sys. of Mo. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 640 F.3d 821, 827 (8th Cir. 2011).
175. Mirch, 316 F. App’x at 643 (citing Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992)).
176. Walker v. Bd. Trs. Reg’l Trans. Dist., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1109 (D. Colo. 1999) (qualified
immunity is “only available to those defendants sued in their personal capacities”).
177. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity
protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.’”) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see also Plumhoff v.
Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014) (“An official . . . is entitled to qualified immunity unless it
is shown that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was ‘clearly established’ at
the time of the challenged conduct.”).
178. City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015).
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new implied private right of action seems to depend, in part, on subject
matter. Specifically, courts appear to be more hospitable to claims based
on civil rights,179 as opposed to bare claims involving property or
economic loss.180 This is not unusual if one considers the fact that, in
some procedural due process cases involving “mere” property rights, the
Court is willing to postpone a constitutionally required hearing in cases
where “only property rights are involved.”181 A hint of this preference is
already visible in the power of Congress to abrogate a state’s sovereign
immunity if a claim arises from a Fourteenth Amendment civil rights
violation.182 The same understandable preference exists in Congress’
decision to award attorneys’ fees to certain plaintiffs who bring civil
rights actions because they are “vindicating a policy that Congress
considered of the highest priority.”183
No case holds that courts should be more sympathetic to a plaintiff
who brings an implied action to enforce a civil right, rather than an
economic right. However, a 2005 Supreme Court case, Jackson v.
Birmingham Board of Education,184 is instructive. Although the case was
decided during the modern era, which burdens a plaintiff with a
179. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969) (finding private right
of action implied under the Voting Rights Act of 1965), abrogated on other grounds by Ziglar v.
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969)
(finding private right of action implied under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 for discrimination in the sale of real
property), abrogated by Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017); Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307,
315 (4th Cir. 2003) (“It is well-settled that there is an implied private right of action to enforce §
601’s [of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] core prohibition of discrimination. . . . ”).
180. With this in mind, it does not seem to be coincidental that the most expansive era of implied
private rights activity coincided with the passage of civil rights legislation in the 1960s. Indeed,
Justice Rehnquist commented on the expanded role of courts in deciding whether to imply private
actions during the Civil Rights Era: “Congress, at least during the period of the enactment of the
several Titles of the Civil Rights Act[,] tended to rely to a large extent on the courts to decide
whether there should be a private right of action, rather than determining this question for itself.”
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (italics in original).
Similarly, Cass Sunstein calls this the period of the “rights revolution of the 1960’s and 1970’s.”
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 409 (1989)
(referring to the increased number of statutes designed to protect, e.g., the environment, consumers,
and “victims of discrimination”).
181. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 520 (1944) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
This is not to suggest that the Court will always postpone a due process hearing involving property
rights. As the famous case of Goldberg v. Kelly held, it is unconstitutional to deny welfare recipients
a pre-termination due process hearing when the property right at stake involved “the very means
by which to live.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
182. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (explaining that Congress can
abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity “for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment [and to] provide for private suits against States[.]”) (emphasis added).
183. Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 833 (2011) (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390
U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam)).
184. 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
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presumption against the creation of new implied private actions, the
Court nevertheless used Title IX to imply a private action for retaliation
in favor of a plaintiff who was not himself the victim of gender
discrimination.185 Title IX is a civil rights statute designed to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause by prohibiting educational institutions from
discriminating on the basis of gender.186 The origin of the new implied
private action in Jackson began when a male high school coach
complained that his school discriminated against members of the female
basketball team he coached.187 He successfully went on to claim that he
was entitled to bring an implied private right of action under Title IX
because the school “retaliated” against him after he complained.188
The case was unusual, not just from a factual point of view (the
plaintiff himself was not the victim of discrimination), but also from a
statutory interpretation point of view. This is because, although other civil
rights statutes contain specific prohibitions against retaliation,189 Title IX
does not. Nevertheless, the Court held that the plaintiff could bring an
implied private right of action for retaliation under Title IX, despite the
fact that the word “retaliation” does not appear anywhere in the statute.190
Four members of the Court dissented.191 They claimed that the Court
established “a prophylactic enforcement mechanism designed to
encourage whistle-blowing about sex discrimination.”192 The dissent
concluded that, by creating its own enforcement mechanism “out of
185. The Court held:
Nor is the Court convinced by the Board’s argument that . . . Jackson is not entitled to
invoke it [Title IX] because he is an ‘indirect victi[m]’ of sex discrimination. . . . The
statute is broadly worded; it does not require that the victim of the retaliation must also
be the victim of the discrimination that is the subject of the original complaint.
Id. at 179.
186. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . .” absent statutory
provisional exceptions.).
187. Jackson v Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. at 171 (“Jackson began complaining to his
supervisors about the unequal treatment of the girls’ basketball team, but to no avail.”).
188. Id. at 183 (“Title IX . . . supplied sufficient notice to the Board that it could not retaliate
against Jackson after he complained of discrimination against the girls’ basketball team.”).
189. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
190. Specifically, the Court held “Title IX’s private right of action encompasses suits for
retaliation, because retaliation falls within the statute’s prohibition of intentional discrimination on
the basis of sex.” Jackson, 544 U.S. at 178. About the fact that the word “retaliation” does not
appear anywhere in the statute, the dissent argued: “Congress enacted a separate provision in Title
VII to address retaliation . . . Congress’ failure to include similar text in Title IX shows that it did
not authorize private retaliation actions.” Id. at 189 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 184. The dissent was written by Justice Thomas, and joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Kennedy.
192. Id. at 185.
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whole cloth,” what the Court did was to “substitute[] its policy judgments
for the bargains struck by Congress, as reflected in the statute’s text.” 193
Some commentators have questioned whether the Court in Jackson
“overstated its boundaries in finding that Title IX created a private right
of action for retaliation in the absence of a clear Congressional intent to
do so.”194
Finally, while courts may be understandably hospitable to implied
private claims when the subject matter involves civil rights, they are
reluctant to entertain claims when the subject matter involves foreign
affairs. For example, when an informer sought to have a federal court
imply a private action under the Neutrality Act,195 a federal court refused.
Before dismissing the claim, it declared that “courts ‘must be especially
certain . . . before inferring a private cause of action’ in the realm of
foreign affairs.”196
CONCLUSION
The shortcomings of the current approach to implied private rights of
action, anchored on vague notions of legislative intent, have created a
situation of unpredictability and confusion. As a result, implied private
rights of action can be viewed from two extremes. On one hand, is the
picture painted by some courts that believe a private right of action is the
only recourse that remediless plaintiffs, like the 14-year-old student in
Gwinnett, have against officials who refuse to enforce a federal law, or to
enforce a statute that contains a legal right, but does not contain an
express remedy to enforce that right. On the other hand, is the critical
view of implied private rights of action painted by the dissent in Jackson.
Under this view, the judicial creation of implied private actions allows a
court to disregard policies adopted by Congress and substitute its own
policy judgments. The practical result of this effort is to allow a private
plaintiff to create not just a remedy for an already existing legal right, but
instead, as the Court did in Jackson, to create the legal right itself.
Depending on the circumstances of each particular case, it appears that
elements of both extremes may be correct.

193. Id. at 195 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
194. Charles J. Russo & William E. Thro, The Meaning of Sex: Jackson v. Birmingham School
Board and Its Potential Implications, 198 W. EDUC. L. REP. 777, 778 (Aug. 11, 2005).
195. Neutrality Act, 18 U.S.C. § 962. The case involved an attempt by a plaintiff to obtain
money, under an implied private right of action theory, for informing the U.S. government about
vessels that had violated an Israeli naval blockade. Bauer v. Marmara, 942 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.D.C.
2013), aff’d, 774 F.3d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
196. Bauer, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 42. Specifically, the court held that the Neutrality Act “lacks an
express private cause of action, and the court declines the plaintiff’s invitation to imply one.” Id. at
43.

